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Abstract 
An insistent focus on extremism and radicalization with regard to current Islamist trends masks the failures of pluralist  
citizenship, amid a larger crisis of identity. Whether in Muslim-majority societies or in the Euro-North American diaspo-
ra, “Islam” and “politics” are touted as explaining patterns of severe violence by state/non-state actors. Neither catego-
ry accounts more than superficially for the complexities at hand, which revolve around exclusionary models of identity, 
faith and civil society. Successful narratives of inclusive citizenship depend on key markers outside of modernist secular 
orthodoxy. Theologies of inclusion are vital in fostering pluralist civic identities, mindful of the ascendance of puritani-
cal-legalist theologies of exclusion as a salient facet of public cultures. Multiple surveys reveal the depth of exclusivist 
conservatism in diverse Muslim societies. These stances not only undermine civil society as a locus for engendering plu-
ralist identities, but also undergird the militant trends that dominate the headlines. Targeting militants is often essen-
tial—yet is frequently accompanied by the willful alienation of Muslim citizens even within liberal democracies, and a 
growing “official” sectarianism among Muslim-majority polities. Convergent pluralisms of faith and civic identity are a 
vital antidote to the fog that obscures the roots as well as the implications of today’s extremist trends. 
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The Balkan minstrels continued to tell their tales, 
now interrupting each other. In their desire to be ac-
cepted they had forgotten the insults, and humbly, 
almost awkwardly, begged: We want to be like you. 
We think like you. Don’t drive us away. The old lady 
sensed that there was something missing from their 
tales. 
‘Could you sing the things you have been telling us?’ 
she asked. 
They were shaken as if they had been dealt a blow. 
Then, tearing themselves out of their stupor, one af-
ter the other, each in his own language, and finally in 
Latin, said ‘No.’ Non. 
‘Why not?’ she asked kindly. 
‘Non, domina magna, we cannot under any circum-
stances. We are minstrels of war.’ 
They could not break out of the mold. Besides which, 
they would first have to consult their elders. Consult 
the dead…Non. 
Ismail Kadare, Elegy for Kosovo, 1998 
1. Introduction 
For well over a decade—in the wake of the events of 
September 11, 2001, and most notably the US-led “war 
on terror”—responses to Islamist trends have been 
marked by an avowed focus on “extremism.” A rising 
concomitant is the targeting of “radicalization” through 
legislation and social policy. Indeed, the latter is 
deemed a longer term and more subtle facet of the 
strategic response to Islamism, and to militant groups 
in particular. “We are engaged in a struggle that is 
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fought on many fronts and in many forms,” explains 
the United Kingdom home secretary, Theresa May, 
about a counter-terror law that includes banning “ex-
tremist” speakers from universities. “The threat we 
face right now is perhaps greater than it ever has been. 
We must have the powers we need to defend our-
selves” (UK Government, 2014). This was echoed in 
France’s response to the November 2015 terror attacks 
in Paris, where the language of “war” against a foreign 
“army” (Daesh/Islamic State) was coupled with an ex-
tended state of emergency allowing for special police 
powers, and constitutional changes relating to citizen-
ship.1 An embattled “we” is engaged in nothing more, 
or less, than self-defense against the depredations of 
radicals—the very sentiments that drove the expansive 
post-September 11 vision of mortal combat against 
global terror, and the war in Iraq.  
What is new about this ominous threat that will en-
gage us indefinitely? Terms such as “cosmic” and “irra-
tional” are commonly associated with the professed re-
ligiosity of the extremists and radicals that threaten 
our wellbeing (Juergensmeyer, 2003; Neumayer & 
Plumper, 2009; Wilson, 2012). Whether in Muslim-
majority societies or in the Euro-American diaspora, 
“Islam” or “politics” is touted as an explanatory catego-
ry for patterns of severe violence by non-state actors. 
For some—scholars, politicians, journalists—it is not 
merely religion but Islam in particular that accounts for 
a sui generis propensity to violence. Orientalist tropes 
abound here, blithely oblivious or in spite of the 
trenchant critiques of that tradition offered up by Ed-
ward Said and others. For others, the explanations are 
about politics: in a secular age that demands sensitivity 
to scapegoating and persecution, Islam and Muslims 
are foils for struggles that are about perceptions of jus-
tice and the failure of democratic avenues of expres-
sion. To the extent that religion is a significant factor in 
radicalism and militancy, it is confined to extremist 
quarters that can be contained if not eradicated.  
This article argues that neither category provides a 
tenable explanation, for all the historical and scientific 
rhetoric that is proffered in the guise of erudite cri-
tique. A binary view fails to account for a larger identity 
crisis that provides the setting for current Islamist 
trends, militant and otherwise. In a context where 
church and state find themselves in a complex relation-
ship that does not fit the more familiar models—
American, French, Saudi Arabian—religion no longer 
occupies the tidy institutional place that modernity as-
signed it in our individual and collective trajectories. 
Narratives of citizenship ignore this shift at their peril, 
if wedded to secularist claims about civic identities. 
Progressive theologies can play a vital role through in-
                                                          
1 Schofield (2015). The political and ethical perils of the “war 
metaphor” were promptly raised by The Economist—Prospero 
(2015). 
clusive discourse and action. As David Santillana ob-
served nearly a century ago in this regard, “every ques-
tion of law is also a matter of conscience, and jurispru-
dence is based on theology in the final analysis” (1926, 
p. 5). Today, puritanical-legalist stances on the shari’a 
are a prime basis for exclusive and repressive ortho-
doxies: multiple surveys reveal the depth of conserva-
tism on matters of faith and civic culture among ordi-
nary Muslims. These stances nurture the extremism 
that dominates the headlines, and undermine civil so-
ciety as the locus of pluralist identities. Military and 
policy responses to actors such as al-Qaeda, Daesh (“Is-
lamic State”), Boko Haram and al-Shabab are neces-
sary. Yet strategic alliances are rife with and among 
governments that actively promote or shield anti-
pluralist actors. And a deeper malaise of pluralist citi-
zenship within the western diaspora is obscured in the 
war on extremism. 
Without an ethos that takes seriously not only pub-
lic religion but minority traditions in particular, secular 
frameworks of inclusion fall seriously short on effective 
citizenship. Our primary focus here is on the nexus of 
Islamist extremism and the larger malaise of identity in 
a globalized, secular modernity. Insecure identities 
seek shelter in a social and intellectual conservatism 
that may be religious and sectarian, but also secular, as 
in the case of nationalism. Examples of such trends in 
non-Muslim contexts are offered, though an elaborate 
survey is quite beyond the scope of this paper. I will 
first set forth the dichotomous claims about framing 
the militancy of actors that are deemed extremist in 
terms of “Islam” and “politics” as exclusive categories, 
before venturing into the underlying tensions of identi-
ty that find expression in religious conservatism and 
radicalization. Finally, I will address the ensuing chal-
lenges of pluralist citizenship that require an ethos of 
secular and religious inclusion—where material incen-
tives are a necessary but insufficient condition. 
An elucidation here on terminology. “Islamism” is 
an unsatisfactory descriptor of Muslim political action: 
it signals attachment to a faith tradition regardless of 
whether this actually has any merit. We do not stand-
ardly use such loose tags for political Judaism, Hindu-
ism, Buddhism or Christianity. Nevertheless, “Islamism” 
has become a term of art in academic and media 
commentary (Martin & Barzegar, 2010). I use it in the 
sense of a drive to foster “an ideological community,” 
one that strives for state governance through official 
“moral codes in Muslim societies and communities” 
(Bayat, 2013, p. 4). Such drives may be expressed in na-
tional and transnational movements—from al-
Mourabitoun, Boko Haram, al-Shabab and the Taliban, 
to al-Qaeda and Daesh.2 Islamists are distinguished 
                                                          
2 The term “Daesh” is used throughout this paper, as the ap-
propriate acronym for al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham (Is-
lamic State of Iraq and the Levant) (Grayling, 2016). This is also 
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from non-political actors that advocate for spiritual or 
social welfare goals, and also “active pietist” groups 
that aspire to shape civil-political identities. The term 
jihadi, which tends to invoke a religiously-inspired 
struggle against “wordly” targets, including Muslim 
ones perceived as slack in their commitment to Islam, 
is highly diffuse; active pietists and civic movements 
may profess jihad as much as do militants (Abu-Rabi, 
2010; Stephan, 2009). Many Islamists do not espouse 
militancy at all; some prefer the electoral route where 
available, as with prominent Egyptian and Tunisian and 
political actors in the “Arab Spring.” Here, “militancy” 
and “extremism” refer to Islamist choices on this score, 
the acceptance of which is about “radicalization.” The 
choices may be strategic or theological, informed or 
otherwise; it is our task to seek to understand why 
these choices are acted upon. 
2. Framing Extremist Militancy 
2.1. “Islam Is the Answer” 
For an array of commentators, the self-proclaimed re-
ligiosity of actors who resort to violence suffices as the 
rationale for their choices. “Islam” accounts for a spec-
trum of motivations and realities that are summed up 
under the rubrics of extremism and radicalization, 
which characterize militancy ranging from that of ma-
jor non-state groups to freelance terrorists. At its sim-
plest, this equates the most aggressive forms of politi-
cal Islam, or “Islamism,” with Islam as a faith tradition. 
Typical are the post-September 11 writings of Bruce 
Bawer (2006, 2009), Gisele Littman (2005), Mark Steyn 
(2006), and Robert Spencer (2008, 2009). Populist in 
language, style and reach (many have been bestsell-
ers), they perceive an “Islamified Europe” as the ulti-
mate outcome of the mere existence of Muslim mi-
grants—because “Islam itself is a political project,” to 
quote Steyn. Muslim values, then, are not only incom-
patible with those of a Judeo-Christian West, but are 
ultimately ideological more than anything else. Indeed, 
the entirety of Muslim history and civilization are re-
duced—especially in the work of Spencer—to a linear 
narrative of animus against non-Muslims. 
These populist writings, for all their tenuousness, 
have the benefit of an enabling analytical landscape. A 
key node is the “clash of civilizations” posited by Sam-
uel Huntington (1996): an account of “Islamic culture” 
as a singular entity in perpetual conflict with western 
values, a teleology which Muslims fit into no matter 
where they are located. “The underlying problem for 
the West is not Islamic fundamentalism,” according to 
Huntington, but rather “Islam, a different civilisation 
whose people are convinced of the superiority of their 
                                                                                           
the term used by the UN with regard to Syria, as in Resolution 
2254 (2015, December, 18), adopted by the UN Security Council. 
culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their 
power” (1996, pp. 217-218). Although a plethora of cri-
tiques have undercut virtually all the serious claims in 
this account,3 it remains influential after the events of 
September 11. Populist discourse draws on its sweep-
ing assumptions and projections, stoking public fears 
about migration, Muslim minorities and national secu-
rity (Abrahamian, 2003; M. Dunn, 2006; Wright, 2015). 
Then there is the work of scholars such as Daniel Pipes 
(2002a), Niall Ferguson (2004, 2006, 2011), and Ber-
nard Lewis (1990, 2002, 2003), who have weighed in 
with insights on the histories of the Middle East/Islam, 
and the implications for western societies. Many of 
these insights are essentialist in casting Muslims and Is-
lam as a unitary vector separate from and threatening 
to the stability and wellbeing of western societies. 
Even for an eminent historian of the Middle East 
such as Lewis, “Islam” serves as a discrete category 
that ultimately trumps the diverse politics, economics 
and cultures of Muslim societies past and present. His 
tone is more temperate than Huntington’s. Yet the 
same teleology is voiced, wherein western societies 
find themselves in the path of a “Muslim rage” that 
drives contemporary conflicts. Thus: “Islam, like other 
religions, has also known periods when it inspired in 
some of its followers a mood of hatred and violence. It 
is our misfortune that part, though by no means all or 
even most, of the Muslim world is now going through 
such a period, and that much, though again not all, of 
that hatred is directed against us” (Lewis, 1990). But he 
can be cavalier, as in his oft-cited 2004 proclamation to 
a German newspaper that “Europe will have a Muslim 
majority by the end of the twenty-first century at the 
very latest…Europe will be part of the Arab west—the 
Maghreb.” (Schwanitz, 2004).4 Demographics in this 
context is, of course, a charged subject with far-
reaching implications for perceptions of identity as well 
as security. And this is reflected in western academic 
and populist commentary on extremist militancy and 
social radicalization. 
At the most mundane level of linkage between reli-
gious identity and anti-western animus, Pipes pulls no 
punches: “A vast number of Muslims, those living in 
the Europe and the Americas no less than elsewhere, 
harbor an intense hostility to the West. For most Mus-
lims, this mix of envy and resentment remains a latent 
sentiment, but for some it acquires operational signifi-
cance” (2002b). Just as forthright is the Harvard scholar 
Niall Ferguson, no specialist on the Middle East or the 
Muslim world, but an authority on global history. “The 
greatest of all strengths of radical Islam…is that it has 
demography on its side. The western culture against 
                                                          
3 Edward Said (2001) labelled it as being about “a clash of igno-
rance” in which “the West” and “Islam” are analytically poor 
banners. 
4 A claim challenged by The Economist (2006). 
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which it has declared holy war cannot possibly match 
the capacity of traditional Muslim societies when it 
comes to reproduction” (2006). Apart from the intri-
guing claim that demography is a greater weapon than 
ideas or anything else in the extremist arsenal, it is 
worth noting the leap in reasoning from “radical Islam” 
to “traditional Muslim societies.” Furthermore: “A 
youthful Muslim society to the south and east of the 
Mediterranean is poised to colonize—the term is not 
too strong—a senescent Europe…A creeping Islamiciza-
tion of a decadent Christendom is one conceivable re-
sult: while the old Europeans get even older and their 
religious faith weaker, the Muslim colonies within their 
cities get larger and more overt in their religious ob-
servance” (Ferguson, 2004). 
Bruce Bawer is almost regretful about the inexora-
ble nature of this linkage, and the defensive impulse of 
its victims. “Many European Muslims,” he asserts in his 
acclaimed While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is De-
stroying Europe From Within, “may themselves be 
moderates, yet may have a concept of religious identity 
that makes it difficult for them to side with infidels 
against even the most violent of their fellow Muslims” 
(2006, p. 229). Evidence of this may heavily be to the 
contrary, judging by the volume of diasporic Muslim 
denunciation of acts of terrorism by fellow Muslims,5 
and the data on migrant integration and marginaliza-
tion (Saunders, 2012). Yet if one accepts the premise 
that religious identity for Muslims is an undifferentiat-
ed whole—leaving scant room for distinction between 
a member of Daesh or al-Qaeda and a Muslim member 
of Amnesty International or Médecins Sans Fron-
tières—then the apprehensions of Bawer, Lewis, Fer-
guson,  and Pipes are warranted. Indeed, the premise 
was explicitly invoked by Anders Breivik, the Norwe-
gian whose manifesto justifying his 2011 acts of mass 
terror repeatedly cited the writings of Bawer, among 
other influences (Breivik, 2011; see more generally 
Townsend & Traynor, 2011). 
Those sentiments frequently lament the erosion of 
Europe’s Christian identity, as a bastion against Islam 
and Muslims. How ironic, then, that the wider modern-
ist discourse, even in much of the Muslim world, is 
about secularism as serving as a bastion against reli-
gion at large. At its most assertive, this latter view 
strips secularism down to the absence of public and 
private religion—a state of affairs which is deemed ra-
tional and friendlier to nonviolence. For the cluster of 
                                                          
5 This extends to repeatedly petitioning mainstream newsme-
dia to cease using the term “Islamic State” in describing the 
group widely called “Daesh” in the Muslim world—and a 
graphic social media campaign launched in 2014 against the 
group under the banner #NotInMyName. See more generally 
Charles Kurzman’s web-page, Islamic statements against ter-
rorism. Retrieved from http://kurzman.unc.edu/islamic-
statements-against-terrorism 
“new atheists,” such as Richard Dawkins, Daniel Den-
nett, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali, the trends in post-September 11 extremism have 
much to do with religious belief (Kettell, 2013; Jacoby 
& Yavuz, 2008). The intellectual integrity of this stance 
has been trenchantly challenged in assorted quarters, 
along with it ideological direction (Atran, 2010; Hedges, 
2008; Ruse, 2010; Taylor, 2013). Suffice it to say that 
the new atheism plays into the politics of both the 
“clash of civilizations” and the demographic thesis, 
feeding public phobias about an invasive irrationality 
tied to Islam and Muslims. “We are at war with Islam,” 
proclaims Sam Harris, “with precisely the vision of life 
that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran, and fur-
ther elaborated in the literature of the hadith, which 
recounts the sayings and teachings of the Prophet” 
(2004, p. 110). A stronger reiteration of Huntington 
would be hard to find. 
2.2. “Politics Is the Answer” 
Secular globalization, argues the French sociologist 
Olivier Roy in Holy Ignorance, has snapped the pre-
modern link between religion and culture. Religions 
today tend to regard culture as “profane, secular, or 
pagan” (2010, p. 28), which stakes a claim to authentic-
ity by asserting a purity that renounces the political. 
But since politics, like culture, is everywhere, it is sub-
sumed within faith traditions—thus sacralizing the 
world. For Roy, this is the ultimate counterpoint to 
modernity’s secularization of the world, wherein every-
thing that was once sacred is now subject to the ap-
praisal of the economic, social and scientific. In the 
confrontation of faith and material culture, “holy igno-
rance” is rife: each side reimagines the other in its own 
image, a process that “is not contradicted by external 
social practice” (2010, p. 217). Roy’s rich data is not 
merely about faith traditions resisting external social 
realities, but equally about the secular “formatting” of 
religious practices in public policy and corporate cul-
ture, with scant regard to the actual complexities of 
those practices. 
The flipside of claiming that Islam explains extrem-
ist militancy and radicalism, then, is that hard political 
realities do so. A major strand of analysis aims to coun-
ter the secularist essentialism that frames religion, and 
Islam in particular. The cliché that “Islam is way of life” 
ends up signifying that everything is somehow about 
theology. Orientalism’s long history of doing this is a 
matter of record, and the legacy remains with us (Said, 
1997, 1994). Sami Zubaida’s Beyond Islam offers a de-
tailed account of Middle East modernity that strives to 
locate religion within economic and social contexts, 
pointedly rejecting the very idea of “Islamic society” so 
beloved of Orientalist narratives (2011). Instead, it is 
the “materiality of religion” in everyday life—
expressed in “the shaping of political actors, alliances 
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and conflicts”—that Zubaida holds up for appraisal, no-
tably in premodern Ottoman and present day Egyptian, 
Iranian and Turkish societies (p. 78). The tangibility of 
this approach to understanding religion, along with its 
humanizing quality, stand in stark contrast to the exoti-
cization and othering of Orientalist accounts. Further, 
the ciphers of oppositional “western” and “Islamic” so-
cietal values are exposed, with substantial sociological 
data about their shared and overlapping realities, past 
and present. 
At the same time, such approaches can secularize 
faith-centred impulses and actions. What Said called 
the “political actualities” entailed by the trends that 
proclaim a “return to Islam,” tend here to overwhelm 
and obscure the theological drives that are real fea-
tures of the landscape (1997). This is not necessarily 
the intent—which, typically, is to offer a sober counter-
narrative to essentialist accounts. Thus in Doug Saun-
ders’ The Myth of the Muslim Tide: Do Immigrants 
Threaten the West, the reader is offered an impressive 
corpus of statistical and historical data that map the 
social pathways of migrants in Europe and North Amer-
ica, including Catholics and Jews (2012). The debunking 
of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim claims is cogent 
and, in the present climate, laudable. Still, Saunders 
echoes the view that secularizing trends among Muslim 
migrants should reassure us—along with the growing 
“privatization of religion” in Muslim societies such as 
Egypt, Iran and Turkey. Social inclusion and social 
peace rest on the conformity of Muslims to a version of 
modernity that is familiarly secular. 
Again, in response to the puritanical tendency to 
separate religion from public culture noted by Roy, 
there are official attempts at doing the reverse. Cultur-
al categories, after all, are more amenable to secular 
analysis and management in public policy/lawmaking—
the “formatting” of religion (2010, pp. 187-191). This is 
accentuated in settings where official secularism is 
hard-wired into the constitution, as in France and Bel-
gium; but Roy’s evidence extends far beyond. In the 
US, where religion is well integrated into political cul-
ture, as well as Saudi Arabia and Iran, where official or-
thodoxies prevail, minority practices must fit into the 
approved administrative formats. The growing diversi-
fication among religions worldwide, institutional and 
otherwise, intensifies the challenge of “managing” 
them via existing formats (Bouma, 2008; Juergensmey-
er, Griego & Soboslai, 2015). Moreover, new security 
regimes worldwide since the events of September 11, 
2001, and the Edward Snowden revelations of 2013, 
have ushered in pervasive intrusions into group and in-
dividual domains (Lyon, 2015)—underscoring the need 
to format and control a range of “religious” behaviors, 
from piety and worship to socio-political activity. In a 
reminder of how surveillance schemes can violate the 
basic civil rights of religious groups, the US Court of 
Appeals rebuked New York City police for the arbitrary 
“classification” of Muslims along lines reminiscent of 
official abuses against African-Americans, Jews, and 
Japanese-Americans (Hassan vs. The City of New York, 
2015). 
For Will Kymlicka, a leading scholar of citizenship in 
diverse societies where Muslims live in diaspora com-
munities, the emphasis has been on “cultural inclu-
sion” as the gateway (2001; Kymlicka & Norman, 
2000); this is rationalized in terms of democratic and 
social justice, and the imperatives of civic education. 
Minority rights are likewise framed in terms of the 
complexities of ethnic politics and effective legal-
political accommodation (Pföstl & Kymlicka, 2015). 
Tariq Modood draws attention to the limits of such 
multicultural frameworks when it comes to religious 
minorities, calling for more effective forms of secular-
ism to accommodate such citizens (2000). Being secu-
lar does not ipso facto mean being “value neutral;” 
secularism itself embodies a variety of value-postures 
on civic life (Berger, 1999; Bhargava, 1998; Martin, 
2005). Recent literature has gradually taken this on 
board, as in Joshua Castellino and Kathleen 
Cavanaugh’s seminal Minority Rights in the Middle East 
(2013), which is attentive to the dynamics of religious 
and socio-cultural identities in pursuit of equitable citi-
zenship. It falls short, though, in engaging with the 
growing role of the shari’a with regard to the region’s 
minorities, beyond normative statements (Sajoo, 
2014).  An incisive study of the Coptic minority in Egypt 
by Paola Pizzo explores the vital role of institutional 
faith actors on all sides in seeking both social and polit-
ical inclusion—and importantly, links this to civil socie-
ty (2015). There is a hint here of the evolving theolo-
gies of civic membership, though this remains 
unexplored. 
The upshot is a thrust to frame the issues in politi-
cal terms, at the expense of attention to theological 
components. Despite much criticism, the analytical vo-
cabulary of human rights, minority claims, and social 
justice remains dominantly secular and secularizing. In 
significant part, this reflects frail public support even in 
liberal democratic societies for the accommodation of 
some religious expressions in the civic domain, espe-
cially when “multicultural tolerance” involves Muslims 
post-September 11 (Benton & Nielsen, 2013; Wright, 
Johnston, Citrin, & Soroka, 2016). Examples range from 
veiling to municipal zoning for mosques; a conspicuous 
display of civic resistance was the 2009 Swiss ban on 
minarets, after the results of a referendum that strong-
ly overrode the official accommodationist stance 
(Cumming-Bruce, 2009). These public encounters with 
religion bring “sacred” laws and norms under the scru-
tiny of the political domain and can impart a strong 
sense of desacralization, if not secularization. Evident-
ly, it is not only Islamists and their counterparts in oth-
er traditions who politicize their faith. Indeed, religious 
actors “struggle to come to terms with the very social 
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landscape that the secular state was meant to address, 
namely the vast variation of identities housed within 
the borders of the nation” (Juergensmeyer et al., 2015, 
p. 32).  
3. Extremism, Faith and Identity 
3.1. Modernity’s Orphans 
Shortly after the arrest of Anders Breivik for the cold-
blooded slaughter of civilians on the Norwegian island 
of Utøya on July 22, 2011, there was consternation 
among the police over his main preoccupation. Amid 
fresh corpses and pools of blood, Breivik demanded at-
tention for a tiny cut on his finger, from a splintered 
piece of a victim’s skull. “Look, I’m hurt. This will have 
to be bandaged up...I can’t afford to lose too much 
blood,” he complained. Later in prison, Breivik bitterly 
grieved the failure to upgrade his game console from 
Playstation2 to Playstation3, and also the grip on his 
institutional rubber pen. He strutted like a bodybuilder 
for a prison photo. On the basis of psychiatric reviews, 
the court ruled that Breivik was not psychotic. Re-
counting at length the narcissism, lack of empathy, iso-
lated childhood, and the screed (noted above) that 
voiced a hate-filled politics, Karl Knausgaard argues 
that these cannot fully explain why Breivik committed 
what has been called “the worst attack on Norwegian 
soil since the Second World War”:  
“Breivik’s deed, single-handedly killing seventy-
seven people, most of them one by one, many of 
them eye to eye, did not take place in a wartime 
society, where all norms and rules were lifted and 
all institutions dissolved; it occurred in a small, 
harmonious, well-functioning, and prosperous land 
during peacetime. All norms and rules were an-
nulled in him, a war culture had arisen in him, and 
he was completely indifferent to human life, and 
absolutely ruthless. That is where we should direct 
our attention, to the collapse within the human be-
ing which these actions represent, and which makes 
them possible.” (Knausgaard, 2015)6  
For all the flaunting of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim 
bigotry, Breivik’s bizarre acts leading up to, during and 
after the massacre amount, for Knausgaard, to “role-
playing, rather than political terrorism.” One may quar-
rel with his conclusion, which seems to assume that 
such role-playing is necessarily distinct from terrorism; 
terrorists are often intent on posturing larger-than-life 
roles. Yet it is surely true that the erosion of basic hu-
man constraints against acts of mass murder in peace-
time and prosperity is no ordinary thing, and suggests 
                                                          
6 Knausgaard’s account draws heavily on the comprehensive 
narrative in Sierstad (2013). 
acute alienation. Knausgaard contrasts the internal col-
lapse of constraints and instincts with their exter-
nal/societal demise in situations like Iraq and Syria, and 
earlier in the Balkans and Rwanda. But the extraordi-
nary brutality of Daesh, al-Qaeda, and the like is also 
perpetrated by recruits (and “supporters”) from places 
of relative peace and prosperity across the world.7 In 
other words, by individuals who have much in common 
with Breivik. Daesh’s behavior, Knausgaard observes, 
“cannot be ascribed to people having suddenly become 
evil but, rather, to the disintegration of the mecha-
nisms that in a civilized society typically prevent people 
from engaging in rape and murder.” This social disinte-
gration, then, runs with the internal collapse of indi-
vidual constraints and instincts. 
Modernity’s alienating structural effects on individ-
ual identity—anomie—were evident over a century ago 
to Emile Durkheim, and are a core concern in the social 
sciences (Orru, 1987). The effects are heightened by 
secular globalization as a vital feature of the contem-
porary landscape. As noted, public culture is in tension 
with religion not only among communities of faith, but 
also in the policy frameworks of modern states that 
“format” religious practices and institutions. It is no 
surprise that the ensuing challenges to identity can 
provoke strong responses. The “politics of resentment” 
finds global expression along diverse avenues (Mazar, 
2014), from fierce protests over dignity and national 
pride to violent insurgencies on behalf of imagined 
precolonial identities. Narratives of humiliation, griev-
ance and fear are a staple not only of extremist groups, 
but also of nationalisms and “democratic” dema-
gogues. Receptivity to them rests on political and social 
alienations. For the anthropologist Scott Atran, who 
has interviewed youths drawn to violence on six conti-
nents—including most recently in Iraq—the alienations 
feed a “dynamic countercultural movement”: 
“Violent extremism represents not the resurgence 
of traditional cultures, but their collapse, as young 
people unmoored from millennial traditions flail 
about in search of a social identity that gives per-
sonal significance and glory. This is the dark side of 
globalization. They radicalize to find a firm identity 
in a flattened world where vertical lines of commu-
nication between the generations are replaced by 
horizontal peer-to-peer attachments that can span 
the globe.” (Atran, 2015) 
Social bonds and sacred values are key attractions in 
countering modernist alienations (Atran, 2010; Atran, 
Hammad, & Gomez, 2014). Groups like Daesh and al-
Qaeda offer both: the intimacy of family-like group af-
                                                          
7 The cumulative number of foreign recruits to Daesh is esti-
mated to have doubled in the year since mid-2014, at 
27,000−31,000 from 86 countries (The Economist, 2015). 
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filiation, and a view of the shari’a as sacred (2014). Be-
yond providing comfort and empowerment, sacred 
values confer legitimacy to narratives of grievance and 
of heroic response against long odds. Secular causes 
such as nationalism and ethno-cultural pride may simi-
larly offer legitimating narratives, along with kinship-
like support. But religious affiliations have the ad-
vantage of being inherently transnational, which allows 
for a greater repertoire of symbolic and social capital—
with access to the digital tools of a globalized public 
sphere (Bunt, 2009; Eickelman & Anderson, 2003). So-
cial media is not incidental to religious movements, but 
often a core aspect of their profiles and global reach; 
the gap between cyber and real communities offering 
social bonds and sacred values is rapidly shrinking (Bunt, 
2009, pp. 291-292). Modernity’s orphans are seldom 
averse to using its technological assets to the full. 
Yet modernity’s orphans are not confined to the 
margins of extremism or to “fundamentalist” religiosi-
ty. Anomie is a wider “malaise” (Taylor, 1991, 2007), 
and the responses to its secular forms are manifold. 
Multiple studies on both sides of the Atlantic over the 
past decade have found remarkably little to distinguish 
the demographic markers of “violent extremists” from 
the rest of the population (Atran, 2015; Patel, 2011; 
Travis, 2008). They are usually not well-schooled in re-
ligion; many are outright irreligious. Conventional fami-
ly ties are common, and evidence of pathologies is no 
greater than for the mainstream. Although many come 
from lower economic strata—in western and Muslim-
majority countries—there is also marked representa-
tion from the middle classes. In this vein, while most 
Muslims in the western diaspora feel that they belong 
to their countries of residence, local populations, nota-
bly in Germany and Spain, mostly believe the contrary 
(Benton & Nielsen, 2013; Saunders, 2012). Pew surveys 
of US Muslims over several years consistently find neg-
ligible levels of sympathy, much less support, for ex-
tremism, and far higher levels of satisfaction with 
American life than is found in the general public (Pew 
Research Centre, 2011). By contrast, only 33% of the 
US public believed that Muslim Americans wish to be 
an integral part of the nation. On the eve of Republican 
presidential candidate Donald Trump’s call in Decem-
ber 2015 to exclude Muslims from entry into the US, 
55% of Americans had an unfavorable view of Islam, 
and sentiments toward Muslims were the “coldest” of 
any religious community (Chalabi, 2015). Trump’s pro-
posal was supported by a majority of Republicans 
(43%) and 25% of all Americans, according to an NBC-
Wall Street Journal poll (Bradner, 2015). 
Isolating violent extremists from ordinary Muslims or 
mainstream society, it turns out, is harder for various 
publics, demagogues, and social scientists than identify-
ing the sources and symptoms of modernist angst. It is 
harder still in the diverse societies of the “Muslim 
world”—from South-Central Asia and West Africa to the 
Middle East and North Africa—where fresh syntheses of 
Islam and modernity are in the making (Sajoo, 2008). 
Radicalization and violent extremism are real phenome-
na; yet they cast a fog over the complexity of modern 
social imaginaries, and hence to the nature of responses 
to those phenomena by states and civil societies. 
3.2. Pluralism Revisited 
In the aftermath of the 2010−11 uprisings in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya and Yemen that came to be described as 
“the Arab Spring,” a study on youths aged 17 to 31 in 
2013 yielded telling results (Al-Anani, 2015; Atassi, 
2013). The new governing institutions were uniformly 
felt to be unrepresentative, and most had no party af-
filiation. Large majorities considered themselves as 
Muslims first, ahead of national citizenship; the excep-
tion was Egypt, where 35% did so. Majorities in all four 
countries—from 91% in Libya to 57% in Egypt—favored 
implementing the Shari’a as national law. In Tunisia, 
widely regarded as the success story of the Arab 
Spring, only 14% felt that the revolution which toppled 
the authoritarian government of Zine El Dine Ben Ali 
was a success. Constitutional reforms have since gar-
nered much public support, and a civil society coalition 
won the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize (Chan, 2015). Yet Tu-
nisia is among the highest sources of recruits per capita 
to Daesh and al-Qaeda, ahead of Saudi Arabia and ex-
ceeded only by Jordan (Sengupta, 2014).  
The survey results are consistent with recent trends 
regarding citizenship, identity and religiosity across 
Muslim-majority societies. In tandem with fragile rule 
of law and democratic governance, citizenship tends to 
entwine with religious identity across the Middle East, 
South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Enacting the sha-
ri’a as the law of the land is favored by over 70% of the 
population in states ranging from Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Jordan, Nigeria and Pakistan to Indonesia, Morocco, 
Malaysia and the Palestinian Territories; the only re-
gions where firm majorities oppose this are Central 
Asia and Southeastern Europe (Pew Research Centre, 
2015). In sub-Saharan states where Muslims are a rela-
tively small minority, the shari’a is still desired by more 
than half of Muslims (52%–74%) as national law. Reli-
gion is felt to be a precondition for individual moral 
standing by a majority of Muslims in all regions (Pew 
Research Centre, 2013). For large majorities the shari’a 
is the divine word, undistinguished from the corpus of 
legal rules or fiqh (An-Na’im, 2008; Moustafa, 2013; 
Pew Research Centre, 2013). It is also understood as 
subject to a single interpretation by the majority, espe-
cially in South Asia and the Middle East (Pew Research 
Centre, 2013); strong majorities in the Muslim world 
also hold to a singular understanding of Islam (Pew Re-
search Centre, 2012).8  
                                                          
8 Morocco and Tunisia stand out as exceptions to both claims: 
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Perhaps not surprisingly, the very acceptance of 
Muslim minorities is narrow. A majority of Egyptians, 
Indonesians and Jordanians, who are Sunni, do not 
recognize the Shi’a, whose origins are anchored in the 
earliest years of Islamic history, as fellow Muslims (Pew 
Research Centre, 2012). The Ahmadiyya minority, 
whose orientation is Sunni, enjoys even less ac-
ceptance. Sufi communities, most of which are also 
Sunni in orientation and whose esotericism has long 
been regarded as a core facet of Islam, are today rec-
ognized as Muslim by about half of Egyptians, Tunisians 
and Iraqis (Pew Research Centre, 2012). Post-
September 11 initiatives to broaden the theological 
fold, such as the Amman Declaration by leading Sunni 
and Shi’a institutional figures who affirmed an inclusive 
and tolerant Islam (International Islamic Conference, 
2005), have since run into hardline sectarian polemic at 
the highest levels (Fahim, 2015). Given the level of sec-
tarianism not only in civil conflicts in Afghanistan, Bah-
rain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, but more broad-
ly in tensions across the Muslim world, the theological 
backdrop—how the shari’a is perceived, and how indi-
vidual/communal identities are tied to particularistic 
interpretations of Islam—can hardly be dismissed as 
merely captive to politics.  
Theology stirred with politics has long been a staple 
of al-Qaeda, despite the hollow claims to juristic com-
petence by Osama bin Laden (Lawrence, 2005). If the 
leaders of Boko Haram, Daesh, al-Shabab and the Tali-
ban are even less versed on the finer points of theolo-
gy, this has not stood in the way of their claims to au-
thenticity and orthodoxy (Burke, 2015; McCants, 2015; 
Nordland, 2015). Even Arabic poetic traditions are mar-
shalled in the service of these claims (Creswell & 
Haykel, 2015). And Daesh has invoked ritual, scripture 
and tradition, embodied in a manual, to rationalize the 
sexual enslavement of female children (Callimachi, 
2015). This is endemic to the misogynistic attitudes 
that find their way into interpretations of gender in 
theology, far beyond the confines of “extremism” (Mir-
Hosseini, Al-Sharmani, & Rumminger, 2015). 
The conservative trends in the politics of identity 
that have provided such fertile ground for extremist 
theologies of exclusion are not confined to Muslim soci-
eties. Pew’s “Social Hostilities Index,” a complex meas-
ure of religiously-inspired acts of abuse/aggression by 
individuals and groups, has spiked—with intense ma-
joritarian attacks against vulnerable minorities (often 
Muslims) in India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and 
China, as well as in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca, and Indonesia (Pew Research Centre, 2014). For the 
celebrated Indian writer Arundhati Roy, “intolerance” 
is an utterly inadequate term to describe the “terror” 
that minorities such as Christians, Dalits, and Muslims 
                                                                                           
firm majorities subscribe to multiple interpretations, though in 
both countries majorities insist that the shari’a is divine. 
now experience in her country (Roy, 2015). Much the 
same can be said of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, 
where Buddhist “extremism reflected in the laws sug-
gests a future of even greater violence” (Mathieson, 
2015; Physicians for Human Rights, 2013). Of late, re-
searchers in the US describe thus the vulnerability of 
Muslims there:  
“It is not just that hatred against Muslims is ex-
tremely high today. It’s that it’s exceptional com-
pared with prejudice against every other group in 
the United States. We examined prejudicial search-
es against black people, white people, gay people, 
Asians, Jews, Mexicans and Christians. We estimate 
that negative attitudes against Muslims today are 
higher than prejudice against any group in any 
month since 2004, when Google began preserving 
detailed data on search volumes.” (Soltas & Ste-
phens-Davidowitz, 2015)9 
Hostility toward individuals and groups on the basis of 
their perceived faith affiliation inevitably privileges one 
kind of identity—religious—over others. Likewise, the 
stated theological agendas of extremist organizations, 
no matter how shallow or manipulative, make exclusive 
claims on the religious identities of their recruits and vic-
tims alike. Where does this leave the multiple identities 
that are central to pluralist civil society, and to counter-
ing violent extremism (Sen, 2006; Maalouf, 2001)? Mod-
ernist discourse has hitherto insisted on a “secularist” 
basis for the former. But secularist orthodoxy collides 
with hard realities about the place of religion in individ-
ual and group identities. Casting civic culture and citizen-
ship as “bulwarks against religion” does not empower 
secular reason so much as narrow the reach of social in-
clusion in diverse public spaces (Taylor, 2011, p. 56; Ste-
pan, 2011; Nandy, 1998). A nuanced appreciation of 
what is “secular,” beyond the reflexive antagonism to-
ward religion that is too often found in secular ortho-
doxy, brings us closer to the kind of pluralist citizenship 
that is professed in liberal ideology (Stepan, 2011). 
A wariness of theologies of exclusion, religious or 
secular, is entirely proper in defending pluralist civic 
cultures. Far from being confined to the extrem-
ist/radicalized margins, exclusionary theologies are 
pervasive and fuel for recruitment to the former. A 
conspicuous example: “mainstream” Wahhabi inter-
pretations of the shari’a as spearheaded by Saudi Ara-
bia’s clerical and political establishments are founda-
tional for the theologies of groups such as Daesh and 
al-Qaeda (Armstrong, 2014; Daoud, 2015; Matthiessen, 
2015; McCants, 2015).10 That Saudi Arabia is a key 
                                                          
9 This is accompanied by a spike in actual hate crimes 
(Lichtblau, 2015). Similar trends prevail not only in Europe, but 
also in Australia (K. Dunn, 2015). 
10 Amid the competitive animosity between Riyadh and those 
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western economic and political ally has obvious impli-
cations: a mutual interest prevails in isolating extrem-
ism/radicalization as the “real” foe (Black, 2015). In 
neighboring Bahrain, the “extremist” tag serves not on-
ly to fuel sectarian repression of the Shi’a majority, but 
to undermine democratic accountability, with Saudi 
Arabia playing a leading role; as noted by Human 
Rights Watch (HRW), among others, this is abetted by 
Britain and the United States (Americans for Human 
Rights & Democracy in Bahrain, 2015; HRW, 2015; 
Ramesh, 2016). The extremist tag has also been ex-
ploited in Central Asia, where perceived Wahhabi 
tendencies have led to authoritarian crackdowns on 
any overt religiosity—as in Tajikistan, where even 
beards and dark clothing are suspect (Paraszczuk, 2015; 
Sarkorova, 2016). In an echo of the Soviet era, citizen-
ship is construed strictly along lines of exclusive secular 
orthodoxy. Nor is there a dearth of such baggage today 
within western mainstreams, with the ascendance of the 
far-right and the banality of hate speech, in which reli-
gious identities are engaged willy-nilly. 
Pluralisms that draw on theologies of inclusion, be-
yond mere accommodation or tolerance, offer the pro-
spect of bridging modernist divides toward a richer civ-
ic identity. Scholars such as Diana Eck, Ashis Nandy and 
Charles Taylor have wrestled with Hindu and Judeo-
Christian makings of fresh cosmopolitanisms—
alongside Abdullahi An-Na’im, Tariq Ramadan and 
Omid Safi on the Muslim side—in fragmented public 
domains (Aga Khan, 2015a, 2015b; Karim, 2012; Mar-
shall, 2013; Poor, 2015, pp. 152-158). To the questions 
“who is a Muslim” and “what is Islam,” we have re-
sponses that engage fully with civic domains as well as 
with theology (Ahmed, 2015; An-Na’im, 2008). A fresh 
initiative in this regard is the Marrakesh Declaration (on 
Religious Minorities in Muslim-majority Countries), 
adopted in January 2016 by over 300 religious and polit-
ical leaders from across the Muslim world (Marrakesh 
Conference on the Rights of Religious Minorities in Pre-
dominantly Muslim Majority Countries, 2016). In its fo-
cus on minority rights and citizenship, the Declaration 
calls for a vigorous Islamic jurisprudence, alongside a re-
view of educational curricula—while invoking the inclu-
sive spirit of the Charter of Medina drawn up by the 
Prophet Muhammad as a civic expression of religiosity. 
Rather than transcend difference with universalist 
rhetoric and secular “reason,” or merely enable differ-
ences to co-exist, the aspiration here is to mobilize re-
ligious affiliation as a contributor to civic ethics. The 
Rawlsian “overlapping consensus” is thickened, so that 
faith affinities cease being treated as outliers that must 
be privatized (Aga Khan, 2006; Taylor, 2011). Contro-
versies over the wearing of Muslim head/face cover-
                                                                                           
terror groups, a shared sectarian narrative directed at the Shi’a 
and Iran continues to serve overlapping interests (Mathieson, 
2015). 
ings in public spaces (courts, citizenship ceremonies, 
public schools, et al.) point to the dominance of a thin 
description of inclusion, despite its exclusionary im-
pact. Likewise, sectarian trends are a reminder of the 
rigidities of identity among faith traditions: distinctive-
ness is equated with exclusivity, pluralism with dilu-
tion.11 The queries “Who is Shi’a?” or “Who is Sunni?” 
or “Who is Protestant?” call for responses that are 
mindful of the slippage to chauvinism (Sajoo, 2015).  
4. Conclusion 
Exclusionary theologies that are fed by, and in turn re-
inforce, the narrowing of religious identities flourish 
well beyond the periphery, in Muslim and non-Muslim 
domains today. It is not that exclusivism, much less 
conservatism, simply turns into violent extremism on a 
“conveyor belt” of displeasure. Rather, the former vali-
dates ideologies that enable and incite extremism, in-
cluding its sectarian expression. Theologies of inclusion 
matter because they draw on diverse heritages that are 
a legitimate part of a global landscape where religious 
identities matter. Faith traditions have long embodied 
a “rooted worldliness,” a transnational sensibility with 
local commitments, as integral to their ethics. This is 
inconsistently nourished: religions, like secular cul-
tures, have historic ups and downs in the generosity 
accorded the Other. Both require cultivation on this 
score, and convergence.  
Yes, deficits in the quality of life, employment, 
equality, and accountable governance fuel disaffection 
that extremist violence thrives on. The Arab Spring had 
much to do with such disaffection, and the appeals to 
empowerment offered by Islamist actors (Bishara, 
2013; Hamid, 2014). But neither material incentives 
nor military responses can obliterate extremist vio-
lence, even if they were to succeed in disposing of 
Daesh, al-Qaeda, and their like. Still less can they an-
swer the challenge of exclusive identities that under-
mine civil society, citizenship and gender equity. 
“Non, domina magna, we cannot under any circum-
stances.” This is the response in diverse tongues of the 
minstrels of war when asked to sing their shared narra-
tives, in our epigraph from Ismail Kadare’s Elegy for Ko-
sovo. The mold that holds the minstrels captive is too 
embedded, and the compulsion for war too robust, to 
let them partake in the grander narrative which they 
find so attractive. Kadare’s lyrical account of the con-
                                                          
11 In a graphic illustration, Wheaton College, a prestigious 
Christian evangelical institution located near Chicago, sus-
pended a tenured professor who donned a hijab in solidarity 
with Muslims who “worship the same God.” Her statement 
was deemed unacceptable on the basis that the Christian con-
cept of God is uniquely Trinitarian and thence different from 
the unitarian Allah. After protests against her suspension 
among students and faculty, a settlement was reached for the 
professor to leave Wheaton (Hauser, 2016). 
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flicts in ex-Yugoslavia may be taken as symbolic of the 
ethno-religious inheritance that plagues the orphans of 
modernity. Yet this leaves out the role of modernity’s 
own minstrels, notably those wedded to secular ideo-
logies that impel wars on the Other. In Miroslav Volf’s 
striking engagement with the stakes in the Balkan con-
flicts, the “character of social agents and their mutual 
engagement” is central to a theological exploration 
(Volf, 1996, 2016). Social inclusion, then, is as much a 
religious as a secular preoccupation—which calls for a 
more sophisticated appreciation of what these catego-
ries stand for. When the minstrels on each side have 
woken from what Kadare calls their “stupor,” can they 
afford to say “non” to a fresher pluralism? Syria, Yem-
en, Iraq, Afghanistan and a host of other broken socie-
ties await the response. 
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